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Feeling-of-knowing experiences breed curiosity
A central tenet in theoretical work on metacognition is that retrieval experiences during
memory search can exert control over behaviour. States of curiosity, which reflect
motivational tendencies to seek out information, may play a critical role in this control
function. We conducted two experiments to address this idea, focusing on links between
feeling-of knowing (FOK) experiences, memory-search duration, and subsequent
information-seeking behaviour. We administered an episodic FOK paradigm that probed
memory for previously studied face-name pairs and subsequently provided an opportunity
to select limited pairs for restudy. This set-up allowed us to test whether current search
duration and subsequent restudy choices are biased towards information with high FOK
ratings. Results revealed a positive relationship between FOK ratings and the response
times of these judgements. We observed a similar positive relationship between FOK
ratings and subsequent item selection for restudy. Moreover, experimental manipulations
of FOK ratings based on familiarity of the face cues also had parallel effects. Our findings
suggest that metacognitive experiences during unsuccessful retrieval from episodic
memory can induce states of curiosity that shape behaviour beyond the immediate retrieval
context. Curiosity may act as a bond to ensure that memory gaps identified through
unsuccessful retrieval adaptively guide future learning.
Keywords: metacognition; information-seeking; retrieval; metamemory; familiarity

Introduction
Curiosity has become an increasingly studied topic for cognitive psychologists and
neuroscientists alike. Contemporary definitions of curiosity emphasise motivational components
and suggest that it is a cognitive state characterised by the desire to obtain information (Kidd &
Hayden, 2015; Gottlieb et al., 2016). It has been proposed to be distinct from other forms of
information-seeking by virtue of being intrinsically motivated and independent of external
reward (Loewenstein, 1994; Kidd & Hayden, 2015; Gottlieb et al., 2016; Metcalfe et al., 2020).
With the surge in research on curiosity, the close link it shares with learning has become
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a central topic of investigation. Multiple studies have shown that memory encoding, as well as
subsequent consolidation processes, are enhanced when an individual is in a state of curiosity.
For example, in several studies it has been reported that trivia facts are remembered more
accurately when corresponding questions (e.g. “what does the term dinosaur mean?”) are rated as
sparking curiosity, before the facts (e.g. “a terrible lizard”) are revealed (Gruber et al., 2014).
These beneficial effects of curiosity on subsequent memory accuracy have been found to be
lasting over delays of several days (McGillivray et al., 2015; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016; Fastrich
et al., 2018; Stare et al., 2018). Additionally, curiosity-dependent memory enhancements have
been shown to extend to unrelated information presented coincidentally with the curiositytriggering trivia questions (Gruber et al., 2014). At the mechanistic level, there is evidence to
suggest that curiosity-dependent effects on learning build on the engagement of reward circuitry,
including the substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA) and the ventral striatum (Kang et
al., 2009; Gruber et al., 2014). In line with this empirical evidence is the theoretical suggestion
that information may in and of itself be a reward. From this perspective, curiosity functions like
other reward-driven behaviours, such as hunger or thirst, with information acting as the soughtafter reward (Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). An important question to ask in this theoretical context
is whether retrieval-related processes can induce a state of curiosity in which information that is
inaccessible is experienced as rewarding, and therefore leads to subsequent information-seeking
behaviour.
In research on metacognition it has been well-established that unsuccessful retrieval can
be experienced in different ways, and that such experiences have behavioural relevance. A wellstudied example of an experience unique to memory retrieval is the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT)
phenomenon (Brown & McNeill, 1966). Another example is the feeling that we might be able to
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recognise the answer that we cannot recall among multiple alternatives, an experience that is
referred to as a feeling-of-knowing (FOK) in the memory literature (Hart, 1965). Such FOK
states have been documented in relation to retrieval of semantic information (e.g. “What is the
capital city of Ghana?”), as well as retrieval of information from episodic memory (e.g. “What is
the name of the boisterous individual I encountered at the party last night?”). Both TOT and
FOK experiences have been suggested to guide decisions about when to stop memory search in
situations that are characterised by a lack of recall success (e.g. Schwartz, 2001; Singer & Tiede,
2008). Critically, it has also been proposed that they may shape subsequent decisions about
whether to seek out the information that could not be recalled (Litman et al., 2005, Metcalfe, et
al., 2017, Hanczakowski et al., 2014). For example, when a familiar person whose name we
cannot recall is a celebrity, we may decide to Google the answer based on the context in which
the person was encountered (e.g. a movie). This illustration highlights a potential role for
metacognitive experiences during unsuccessful retrieval in motivating the type of informationseeking behaviour that defines curiosity, both during and after memory search. In the present
study we aim to address this possibility by examining the relationship between metacognitive
retrieval experiences, specifically FOKs, the duration of immediate memory search, and
subsequent information-seeking behaviour.
Theoretical approaches to metamemory have made an important distinction between its
monitoring and control functions (see Nelson, 1996; Koriat, 2007; and Moulin & Souchay, 2014
for review). Nelson and colleagues have also elaborated in their work on how metacognitive
monitoring and control functions may interact in iterative cycles (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988;
Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1996; Nelson 1996). It has been argued in several theoretical models
that these distinct functions of metamemory play a role in the acquisition, retention, and retrieval
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of information (Nelson 1996, Koriat, 2007). In the context of retrieval, the monitoring aspect
encompasses processes related to assessing the progress and outcome of memory search.
Metacognitive control, by contrast, pertains to how the experiences that emerge during
monitoring guide behavioural choices during and following memory search.
Empirical research on metamemory has focused mostly on the monitoring aspect. Recent
work has provided convincing evidence supporting the notion that FOKs are based on heuristic
inferences, i.e. on inferences that rest on clues other than the sought-after information itself.
Specifically, it has been observed that two main heuristic cues inform people’s monitoringrelated judgements of metamemory: cue familiarity and target accessibility. Studies have shown
that when cues are made to be more familiar, typically by priming prior to study, subsequent
FOK ratings are higher relative to unprimed cues (Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992, Schwartz
& Metcalfe, 1992; Metcalfe et al., 1993). Related work has demonstrated that FOKs increase as
the amount of recalled partial or associated information about a target and the ease with which
this information comes to mind increases, a variable termed target accessibility (Koriat & LevySadot, 2001). Such information could include, for example, remembering that someone’s name
begins with “M” or that it was similar to an actor’s name. In episodic FOK studies,
metacognitive judgements have also been shown to be influenced by retrieval of associated
contextual information (see Thomas et al., 2011, Schwartz, et al., 2014; Hosey et al., 2009;
Isingrini et al., 2016). It should be noted that heuristic inferences based on cue familiarity and
target accessibility have been proposed to contribute to the formation of FOK experiences in
conjunction (Koriat, 2007).
Decisions about the termination of memory search and about subsequent informationseeking speak to the control function of metacognitive retrieval experiences, which, to date, have
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been less frequently studied. One domain in which control functions of metacognitive retrieval
experiences have been studied concerns the duration of unsuccessful memory search. The
outcome from numerous studies converges on the finding that these variables are positively
correlated. Of most relevance for the current research are studies that revealed this relationship in
FOK paradigms (but see e.g. Schwartz, 2001 for similar results in research on TOT). These
studies have typically focused on the relationship between FOK experiences and memory search
during retrieval of semantic information. Gruneberg et al. (1977) first demonstrated that response
times for the report of unsuccessful recall were longer for items for which participants indicated
the presence of an FOK experience relative to items where such an experience was absent.
Subsequent work also revealed that this relationship holds when a graded scale is used to probe
for FOK experiences (Costermans et al., 1992). In other research on this topic, Nelson and
colleagues showed that even response times for incorrect answers in response to factual
questions were positively correlated with the strength of FOK experiences (Nelson & Narens,
1980; Nelson et al., 1984). Although it is difficult to disentangle cause and effect in the
relationship between the duration of memory search and FOKs (see Metcalfe, 2009), the findings
reviewed are compatible with the view that FOK experiences exert control on behaviour at the
level of gating the extent of memory search.
In discussions of the functional role of metacognitive retrieval experiences it has also
been suggested that they may contribute to the control of behaviour outside of the context of the
memory judgment at hand (Koriat, 2007). One behavioural domain in which their control
functions may play out is in guiding subsequent information-seeking behaviour in the external
environment as a reflection of curiosity. Although this idea has intuitive appeal, extant research
that speaks to it directly is limited. To our knowledge, only a single study (Hanczakowski et al.,

Feeling-of-knowing and curiosity

7

2014) has explored this topic in relation to FOK experiences (but see Litman et al., 2005 and
Metcalfe et al., 2017 for studies investigating it in relation to TOT experiences). This study
focused on restudy-choices that immediately followed FOK judgments in an episodic-memory
paradigm for arbitrary paired words that had been encountered in an initial study phase. Results
showed that participants’ restudy choices were correlated with FOK judgement on an item-byitem basis, such that items with unsuccessful recall of the associate and higher FOK ratings were
selected for restudy more frequently than those with lower ratings. This finding suggests that the
control function of FOKs may indeed include information-seeking behaviour. Given that
behavioural choices directly followed the memory judgments on an item-by-item basis in this
study, however, its results do not speak to whether information-seeking is influenced by prior
FOK experiences in lasting ways, namely when the behavioural decision is made outside of the
context of an immediately preceding memory search. Moreover, it also does not address any
potential relationship between control functions of FOK that pertain to duration of internal
memory search and those that pertain to information-seeking behaviour in the external
environment. To the extent that memory search can also be considered to be a type of
information-seeking behaviour it is possible that both control functions rely on shared
mechanisms related to curiosity. This rationale builds on the notion that objective measures of
information-seeking behaviour can serve as direct markers of state curiosity, an assertion that
finds acceptance in the wider literature on curiosity (e.g. Hsee and Ruan, 2016; Lau et al., 2020;
Oosterwijk et al., 2020; see Gruber & Ranganath, 2019, for review and discussion).
In order to answer these questions we adopted a behavioural paradigm previously
employed in our research on experiential aspects of episodic FOKs (Fiacconi et al., 2017). This
paradigm makes use of face-name pairs, rather than word-pairs, to assess FOKs. This is
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important as these stimuli have more ecological validity than word-pairs, as FOK experiences,
and familiarity in general, are frequently triggered in our everyday lives by the faces or names of
people. In our paradigm, participants were tasked with attempting to recall a target name that had
been paired with the image of a person’s face in an initial memorisation phase, after which they
were asked to provide an FOK judgement. Once they had completed this FOK test phase for
each face-name pair, participants were exposed to the face cues once again, and were given the
opportunity to seek out a limited number of the associated names for restudy. We also included a
manipulation of cue familiarity, given that it has been shown to be one of the sources for the
heuristic inferential processes that give rise to FOKs (Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992,
Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992; Metcalfe et al., 1993). In Experiment 1, we assessed the relationship
of FOK experiences to the control of behaviour employing previously studied and novel face
stimuli during the FOK test phase. We offered unlimited time for recall so as to evaluate the
relationship between FOKs and response times at the time of a retrieval attempt, as well as
between FOKs and subsequent information-seeking behaviour. In Experiment 2, we only
employed previously studied faces in the FOK test phase but included a priming manipulation to
selectively probe for the role of cue (i.e. face) familiarity in the relationship between
metacognitive retrieval experiences and subsequent information-seeking behaviour.
We anticipated to find that the strength of FOK experiences would not only be correlated
with participants' response times for corresponding judgments, but that they would also predict
participants’ subsequent information-seeking when offered opportunities for restudy. The
manipulation of cue familiarity in our experimental paradigm also allowed us to explore a
potential causal role for FOK experiences in these relationships. Specifically, we predicted that
the well documented boost of FOKs from increased cue familiarity would lead to corresponding
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increases in immediate memory-search duration and in subsequent information-seeking
behaviour.

Experiment I
Methods and Materials
Participants
In Experiment 1, 45 undergraduate and graduate student participants were recruited from
Western University to take part in the study in exchange for monetary compensation. The data of
36 participants (26 female; age range 18-25) were included in our final analyses, with the
remaining 9 excluded due to insufficient distribution of FOK values (i.e. less than 5 instances for
2 of the 5 scale values on unsuccessful recall trials). This exclusion criterion was introduced to
ensure a sufficient number of trials in each rating for correlation analyses. All experimental
procedures were approved by the Non-Medical Research Ethics Board at the University of
Western Ontario.

Materials
All face stimuli used in this paradigm were taken from the Chicago Face Database (Ma et al.,
2015) and were screened using the published norming data to ensure uniformity in terms of
neutral emotional expression and perceived attractiveness. Selection criteria included a rating
below 3.5 (on a 7-point scale) on all emotional expressions (afraid, angry, happy, sad, surprised,
disgusted, and threatening), and attractiveness ratings between 2 and 5 on the 7-point scale. Of
the faces that met these criteria, a total of 78 faces were randomly selected for experimental use.
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For this study, 156 English names were selected from the U.S. Census Bureau 1990
(https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/names-from-census-1990) for use in the study and recognition
phases of the experiment. The total set was composed of 78 male first names, 78 female first
names, and 156 surnames of medium frequency in the population (frequency rates between
0.15% and .5% for first names, and between 0.05% and 0.5% for surnames, respectively).
Explicit efforts were made to avoid any overlap in pronunciation or spelling between the names
selected (e.g. Julie and Julia or Robert and Roberts), and to avoid any reference to celebrities.
First and last names were then paired to create 156 different full names of comparable length (11
to 17 characters; M = 12.9, SD = 1), and comparable syllable count (3 to 5).
For the purpose of counterbalancing, 78 faces were paired with two sets of names, with
each participant assigned to one set. Assignment of names to faces was pseudo-random, with the
restriction that sex be matched. The remaining non-assigned 78 names served as novel lures in
the forced choice recognition memory test. Of the 78 matched face-name pairs, 52 were
randomly assigned to be memorised (20 Caucasian females, 20 Caucasian males, 6 AfricanAmerican females and 6 African-American males), and the remaining 26 (10 Caucasian males,
10 Caucasian females, 3 African-American males and 3 African-American females) were used as
novel stimuli in the FOK test phase.

Procedure
The experiment was administered using Psychophysics Toolbox Version-3
(http://www.psychtoolbox.org/) and MATLAB R2018b (The MathWorks, Natick, MA) with a
14-inch laptop. It included four different phases (Figure 1), taking approximately 35 minutes for
completion.
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In the first part, participants were asked to memorise a set of 52 face-name pairs. Each
pair appeared on the screen for 3 s with the face appearing above the name. Following a 500 ms
interstimulus interval (ISI), the next pair was presented. Participants were offered a break
halfway through this study phase.
The second phase served for memory testing and began immediately after completion of
the study phase. Here, participants saw the 52 previously studied faces, along with 26 novel
ones, for an unlimited duration, and they were instructed to try and recall the name associated
with each face. On each trial, they responded to two self-paced memory judgement prompts. The
first judgment required a yes/no response concerning the perceived success of their attempted
name recall. The second judgement required FOK ratings; participants were asked to estimate the
likelihood that they would be able to recognise the name associated with the face prompt, if
provided, on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1/very unlikely to 5/very likely). As per the suggestion
of Koriat (1993), this judgement was elicited for all faces presented, regardless of the
participants’ indication of perceived success on any given trial. Following these two judgements,
the next face would appear on the screen after a 500 ms ISI.
After the FOK test phase was completed, participants entered the restudy phase. Here
they were given an opportunity to select up to 39 of the 78 faces previously used as prompts in
the FOK test phase for exposure to the associated name. The criterion of allowing restudy of half
of the face-name pairs was selected as similar studies using restudy choices found a limitation of
such choices to 50% of items to offer a sensitive manipulation to probe information-seeking (i.e.
DeCaro & Thomas, 2019). Note that, unbeknownst to participants, 52 of the 78 faces would have
been memorised initially, with the other 26 only having served as lures in the FOK test phase.
Thus, this exposure constituted a restudy or a first study opportunity, respectively. If the
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participant chose to see the name for a given prompt, the face-name pair would appear on the
screen for 3 s. After this interval, or if they chose not to see the name, the next face would
appear, following a 500 ms ISI. Throughout this phase, participants were also exposed, in the
corner of the screen, to a countdown of how many more face-name pairs were still available for
exposure. If the participant reached the maximum of 39 possible exposures, they were forced to
respond ‘no’ to the restudy prompt for the remainder of trials. No explicit mention of an
additional future memory test was made before or during the restudy phase.
In the fourth and last phase of the experiment, participants completed a self-paced forcedchoice recognition test for the names of all 78 faces used in the FOK test phase, which could
constitute faces initially memorised as well as faces employed as lures, regardless of whether
they had been selected for exposure in the restudy phase or not. In this recognition test, three
name options were presented for each face, namely the name corresponding to the face, a
previously seen name that belonged to one of the other previously studied faces, and an entirely
novel name. The three choices were matched for sex and were presented randomly in one of
three positions.

Results
Do FOK ratings show validity in the current experimental paradigm?
In our first analysis we examined whether the FOK ratings obtained in our experiment carried
validity by virtue of being sensitive to the study manipulation. This analysis leveraged the fact
that not all faces for which FOK ratings were obtained had been studied during the memorisation
of face-name pairs. In line with other studies on FOK experiences (i.e. Fiacconi et al., 2017), this
analysis was limited to trials in which participants indicated that recall was unsuccessful. As
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expected, the average FOK ratings were significantly higher for previously studied than for novel
face cues (see Table 1 for mean FOK ratings), t(36) = 10.11, p < 0.001, d = 1.68. Note that,
although we included a self-report measure of recall success rather than an opportunity to type
out the response as typically done (i.e. Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992), the trials with self-reported
success had numerically higher accuracy in the final recognition-memory test than trials on
which recall was perceived to be unsuccessful (see Table 1), supporting our conjecture that this
self-report does indeed capture aspects of recall success. However, inferential statistics could not
be performed for this comparison, given the small number of trials on which participants
indicated perceived recall success, combined with exclusion of items that were restudied prior to
the recognition-memory test.
A second way to confirm the validity of FOK ratings is to show that they have predictive
value for subsequent accuracy in recognition-memory judgments of names, despite following
trials without successful recall. Towards this end, we computed gamma correlations for
individual participants between their FOK ratings and performance on the recognition memory
test (Nelson, 1984). Importantly, in order to control for any influence of repeated study, this
calculation was completed only, not only for trials without successful recall, but also for trials in
which names had not been selected for restudy. The average gamma correlation between FOK
rating and recognition memory performance for all trials (M = 0.14, SD = 0.37) was significantly
greater than zero, t(34) = 2.22, p = 0.033, d = 0.38. This significant relationship was also present
when only initially studied face name-pairs were considered in the correlation (M = 0.19, SD =
0.35), t(34) = 3.18, p = 0.003, d = 0.54. These results provide further support for the validity of
the FOK ratings provided by participants.
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Are FOK ratings related to response times during attempts to recall the names
corresponding to face cues?
The first marker of curiosity that we examined was that of response times for the initial recall
attempts. Specifically, to calculate response times, we focused on the duration of the recall
attempt that participants engaged in for each trial in the FOK test phase. To assess the
relationship between FOK ratings and response times (Figure 2A) we calculated Spearman
correlations for each participant, between values on both dimensions. We found a positive
correlation when all trials were included (Mean rho = 0.34, SD = 0.21), but also when trials
without perceived successful recall were excluded (Mean rho = 0.34, SD = 0.20; note that in the
large majority of trials, recall was perceived to be unsuccessful, as evident in Table 1). In both
cases, the mean Spearman correlation was found to be larger than zero, t(35) = 9.78, p < 0.001, d
= 1.63 and t(35) = 10.25, p < 0.001, d = 1.71, respectively (Figure 2B). Next, to compare the
average response times for the memory judgements for unsuccessful recall trials between face
cues that had previously been encountered and those that were novel, we conducted a 2x2
ANOVA, with restudied versus not restudied as the second factor. We found a significant main
effect related to whether the face cue had been previously encountered, such that the initially
studied trials (M = 3420 ms, SD = 2048 ms) had longer response times than trials with novel
face cues (M = 3038 ms, SD = 1959 ms) , F(1,35) = 6.86, p = 0.006. . The interaction term did
not reach statistical significance, F(1,35) = 0.25, p = 0.62. Taken together, these results suggest,
in line with prior findings (e.g. Costermans et al., 1992), that the duration of search during
memory judgments is related to the resulting FOK ratings, and is affected by prior exposure to
the cues and the information that is to be recalled.
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Is the impact of prior exposure on response times during recall attempts tied to FOK
ratings?
While the analyses just summarised suggest that response times for search during memory
judgements are related to prior exposure of the face cues, they do not provide an indication as to
whether this relationship is tied to FOK ratings or independent. To address this question, we
conducted a generalised mixed-effects model procedure on response times in R (R Core Team,
2013).
The selected model we used for our analysis contained fixed effect terms representing
FOK rating, item status (whether it had been initially studied or not) and the interaction between
these variables. Details about the development of this model, such as the trimming of nonsignificant effects, and the random effect terms included in it, are described in the Supplemental
Information Section. Importantly, as we were particularly interested in situations in which recall
was ultimately unsuccessful (and where there was no natural endpoint to memory search), trials
with perceived success during recall in the FOK test phase were excluded from this analysis.
With this modelling, we found that participants' FOK ratings positively predicted the
response time during the recall attempt (see Table 2). This relationship was equal for both items
that were initially studied and those that were not, as evident by the non-significant interaction
between FOK rating and item status. Critically, the non-significant effect of item status indicated
that there was no contribution of prior cue exposure on response times that was independent of
FOK ratings.

Are FOK ratings related to subsequent information-seeking?
As a marker of information-seeking, we focused on participants’ choices to study select facenames pairs in the restudy phase that followed the FOK test phase. In this part, participants were
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given an opportunity to select a limited number of face-name pairs when provided with faces as
cues. The corresponding names had either been memorised initially during the study phase or
had not been encountered yet (in the case of faces that were novel in the FOK test phase). Our
primary interest was to determine whether these choices in information-seeking behaviour could
be predicted by the ratings provided in the FOK test phase, and whether they were affected by
prior study. If the relationship between FOK experiences and information-seeking, depicted
visually in Figure 3A, extends beyond the time of a recall attempt, as we hypothesised, then
gamma correlation coefficients between FOK experiences and information-seeking choices
should be positive, paralleling the relationship observed between FOK ratings and memory
search time. We found that the mean gamma between FOK and restudy choices for all trials (M =
0.27, SD = 0.40) was significantly greater than zero, t(35) = 4.13, p < 0.001, d = 0.69. When the
correlation was performed only for trials without successful perceived recall (M = 0.26, SD =
0.37) the relationship remained significantly positive, t(35) = 4.24, p < 0.001, d = 0.71 (Figure
3B). This significant positive relationship indicates that high FOK experiences are associated
with higher subsequent engagement of information-seeking behaviour towards the information
that could not be recalled than low FOK experiences.
Next, we asked whether information-seeking in the restudy phase was affected by
whether the information that could not be recalled in the FOK test phase had in fact been studied
previously (i.e. whether the cues were familiar or not). To address this question, we compared
the proportion of initially studied pairs selected for restudy to the proportion of novel pairs
selected for study. This comparison, when performed for all trials, revealed that previously
studied face-name pairs were selected for restudy at a significantly greater rate than novel pairs
(see Table 1 for proportions), t(35) = 2.83, p = 0.008, d = 0.47. This difference remained
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significant when the comparison was restricted to trials in which prior recall of names was
perceived to be unsuccessful (see Table 1 for proportions), t(35) = 2.81, p = 0.008, d = 0.47.
These findings support our hypothesis that FOK ratings are related to the information that
participants subsequently choose to seek. Moreover, they suggest that pertinent choices are
impacted by the familiarity of the cues, biasing behavioural choices towards previously studied
information. Overall, these results highlight parallels in the relationship between FOK
experiences and search behaviour during memory retrieval, and that between FOK experiences
and subsequent information-seeking behaviour.

Is the impact of prior exposure to face cues on subsequent information-seeking tied to
FOK ratings?
As in our analyses of response time data, the analyses focusing on the relationship between prior
exposure and subsequent restudy choices do not provide information as to whether this effect is
tied to FOK ratings or independent. To address this question, we conducted another mixedeffects modelling analysis, similar to the one performed with response times. As before, only
trials in which recall was perceived to be unsuccessful were included.
The selected model contained fixed effect terms representing item familiarity, FOK rating
and the interaction between these factors (see Supplemental Information Section for further
methodological detail on model selection). This mixed-effects model revealed that participants’
FOK rating positively predicted subsequent restudy choices for items that were initially studied
but not those encountered for the first time during the FOK test phase (see Table 3). For
previously studied items, the log-odds of restudying the name associated with a face cue
increased by 0.36 for each rating point on the 5-point FOK rating scale. In simpler terms, this
means that for a face cue that was rated one point higher on the FOK rating scale than another
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item, the odds of restudying the higher-rated cue were 1.43 times as large. Critically, the effect of
item status was non-significant in these analyses, indicating that there was no contribution of
prior cue exposure on subsequent information-seeking behaviour that was independent of FOK
ratings.

Is information-seeking related to response times during prior recall attempts?
Inasmuch as our results point to a link between FOK ratings and response times during the recall
attempt, as well as between FOK ratings and subsequent information-seeking behaviour, an
important question that remains to be answered is whether participants showed an increased
tendency towards studying items for which they spent more time searching for an answer. This
was explored through the 2x2 ANOVA that we also mentioned when assessing the influence of
prior study on memory search times. A significant main effect of restudy was revealed, both
when the ANOVA was conducted on all trials F(1,35) = 5.84, p = 0.02 and when it was
restricted to trials without perceived recall success F(1,35) = 6.86, p = 0.01. More specifically,
trials later chosen for restudy (M = 3357 ms, SD = 1997 ms for all trials; M = 3367 ms, SD =
2037 ms for trials without recall success) had significantly longer response times for the previous
recall attempt than those that were not chosen (M = 3098 ms, SD = 1881 ms for all trials; M =
3091 ms, SD = 1942 ms for trials without recall success). No significant interaction between
initial study status and restudy decision on recall response time was found for either ANOVA,
F(1,35) = 0.33, p = 0.57 and F(1,35) = 0.25, p = 0.62, indicating that the observed difference in
response time between restudied and not restudied items was equal for previously studied and
novel face cues. This pattern of results suggests that the mechanisms through which FOKs shape
immediate memory search and those through which they guide subsequent information-seeking
may be overlapping.
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Experiment II
We conducted a second experiment with two main goals in mind. Our first goal was to replicate
the predictive relationship between FOK ratings and subsequent information-seeking we
observed in Experiment 1. Our second goal was to assess the impact of cue familiarity on the
relationship between FOK ratings and subsequent information-seeking behaviour in a more
selective manner. In Experiment 1 we manipulated whether items encountered during the FOK
test phase had previously been studied in association with corresponding names or not. As such
the behavioural differences we observed in relation to this manipulation could be due to prior
exposure to the face cues, the memorisation of corresponding names, or a combination of these
two factors. A consideration of the role of cue familiarity in and of itself is important in the
context of our focus on motivational aspects of FOK experiences because an extensive literature
suggests that this familiarity can serve as one of the sources for the inferential heuristic process
that has been proposed to underlie FOK judgments (see Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992; Koriat &
Levy-Sadot, 2001).

Methods and Materials
Participants
Thirty-three English-speaking undergraduate participants from Western University took part in
Experiment 2 in exchange for course credit. The data of 29 participants (15 female; age range
17-22) were used in all analyses, with the remaining 4 participants being excluded due to an
insufficient distribution of FOK values across the scale (see exclusion criterion from Experiment
1). Again, all experimental procedures were approved by the Non-Medical Research Ethics
Board at the University of Western Ontario.
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Materials
The same set of 78 face stimuli from Experiment 1 was used in Experiment 2, along with 52
additional faces that still met the criteria detailed for Experiment 1. Once again, two sets of
pseudo-randomly matched face-name pairs were created. In each set, 78 face-name pairs (30
Caucasian males, 30 Caucasian females, 9 African-American males and 9 African-American
females) were randomly selected to be studied in the study phase. The remaining 78 unmatched
names served as novel lures in the forced-choice recognition test. Of the 78 faces to be
memorised, 26 were chosen to be primed in the priming phase (a third of each demographic).
The priming phase also featured the remaining 52 unpaired faces as distractors (20 Caucasian
males, 20 Caucasian females, 6 African-American males, 6 African-American females). Note
that the rationale for this counterbalancing parallels that employed in Experiment 1. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the two stimuli sets prior to beginning the experiment.

Procedure
The behavioural paradigm employed was very similar to the one used in Experiment 1. This
time, however, the paradigm, which was administered on a 15.6-inch laptop, proceeded through
five different phases and took approximately 45 minutes to complete (Figure 4). In the added
first phase (i.e. the priming phase) participants were exposed to 26 of the faces that would later
reappear in the study phase, alongside 52 distractor faces. During this self-paced part,
participants were instructed to rate the likeability of the person in each image on a 5-point scale.
The phase structure of the remaining parts of Experiment 2 was identical to that in Experiment 1,
including a study phase, an FOK test phase, a restudy phase, and a final forced-choice
recognition test.
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The procedural details of phases two to five were identical to those in Experiment 1
except for the inclusion of primed and unprimed items in the study phase (78 face-name pairs, 26
being primed), and two modifications in the FOK test phase. One modification was related to the
composition of the list of face cues. Instead of being presented with previously studied and nonstudied face cues (i.e. our manipulation in Experiment 1), participants were only exposed to
faces that had previously been studied, with a third of items having been primed prior to study. A
second modification concerned the timing of trials in the FOK test phase. Specifically,
participants were exposed to each face cue for 3 s, rather than for an unlimited duration, before
being directed to the subsequent memory-judgement prompts.

Results
Are FOK ratings and final recognition-memory judgments sensitive to the manipulation of
familiarity of the face cues through priming?
In the first analyses for this experiment, we compared the FOK ratings and subsequent forcedchoice recognition-memory performance for primed faces with those for unprimed faces, to
ensure that our priming manipulation had the expected effects. Like in Experiment 1, the trials in
which participants perceived recall to be successful had numerically higher recognition-memory
accuracies than trials where this recall was perceived as unsuccessful (see Table 1). As expected,
average FOK ratings for primed cues that were not successfully recalled were significantly
greater than average FOK ratings for unprimed cues that were not successfully recalled (see
Table 1 for mean FOK ratings), t(28) = 6.28, p < 0.001, d = 1.17. Also as expected, forcedchoice recognition-memory accuracy for primed faces was no different than the accuracy for
unprimed faces when initial recall was unsuccessful (see Table 1 for recognition memory
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accuracies), t(28) = -0.80, p = 0.43, d = -0.15. Like in Experiment 1, this comparison only
considered pairs that were not selected for restudy (see Table 1 for proportion of primed and
unprimed trials that were not restudied) to ensure that participants had equal exposure to the
primed and unprimed face-name pairs. This pattern is in line with the basic notion that priming
of face cues, without concurrent presentation of associated names, increases the familiarity of the
face cue, which in turn inflates FOK ratings, but does not provide additional information for
subsequent recognition of face name pairs. In other words, these findings confirm that our
priming procedure was successful in manipulating familiarity as a cue that ‘drives’ FOK ratings
(Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992, Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992; Metcalfe et al., 1993; Koriat &
Levy-Sadot, 2001).

Do FOK ratings show validity in the current experimental paradigm?
If participants’ FOK ratings hold predictive validity, they should be related to future memory
performance, as they were in Experiment 1. Again, we computed a gamma correlation
coefficient, for each participant, between FOK ratings and subsequent recognition-memory
accuracy, focusing only trials that were not selected for restudy. As expected, and as observed in
Experiment 1, we found that the mean of these gamma correlations (M = 0.17, SD = 0.27) was
significantly greater than zero, t(28) = 3.48, p = 0.0017, d = 0.65. When this analysis was
repeated using only non-restudied trials that were also unsuccessfully recalled, the mean gamma
correlation (M = 0.11, SD = 0.30) revealed a trend, t(28) = 1.93, p = 0.064, d = 0.36. This change
in outcome of our inferential statistics is likely due to further reduction in the number of trials
included in this comparison.
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Are FOK ratings related to response times during attempts to recall the names
corresponding to face cues?
As in Experiment 1, we first investigated whether the response times during recall attempts were
related to FOK ratings. Once again, Spearman correlations were computed between these
dimensions for individual participants. The mean Spearman correlation between FOK and
response time for all trials (Mean rho = 0.12 SD = 0.19) was significantly greater than zero, t(28)
= 3.37, p = 0.002, d = 0.63. As in Experiment 1, this significant correlation held even when
computed only for trials that lacked perceived recall success (Mean rho = 0.13, SD = 0.21), t(28)
= 3.47, p = 0.002, d = 0.64. Next, we conducted a 2x2 ANOVA to assess the influence of
priming on response time, and the difference in response times between items later restudied and
those not restudied. Focusing on trials without perceived recall success, there was no significant
main effect of priming F(1,28) = 1.76, p = 0.20, nor a main effect of future restudy decision on
response times. However, a significant interaction between these dimensions emerged, such that
unprimed, non-studied items, the condition that was also associated with the numerically lowest
FOK ratings, had the shortest response times across the four conditions, F(1,28) = 4.91, p = 0.04.
Although the lack of main effect of subsequent restudy choices on response times for recall
attempts in Experiment 2 diverged from the positive finding we noted in Experiment 1, this
result is not entirely surprising given that the range of response times was reduced in Experiment
2 based on alterations in the timing structure of the FOK test phase. Therefore, we feel justified
to place more emphasis on our results on response times from Experiment 1 in our overall
interpretation.
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Are FOK ratings related to subsequent information-seeking?
Next, we examined whether the relationship between FOK experiences and subsequent
information-seeking behaviour that we observed in Experiment 1 could be replicated even when
variability in response times for FOK judgments was limited through restriction of exposure to
the face cues. Again, we assessed the relationship of FOK ratings with restudy choices, with data
displayed in graphical form in Figure 5A, through the computation of gamma correlations
between these variables for individual participants. When this calculation was performed for all
trials, the mean gamma correlation was significantly greater than zero (M = 0.41, SD = 0.32),
t(28) = 6.81, p < 0.001, d = 1.27, and it remained significantly greater than zero when trials with
perceived recall success were excluded from the calculation (M = 0.36, SD = 0.27; note that in
the majority of trials, recall was perceived to be unsuccessful, see Table 1 for perceived success
frequency), t(28) = 7.17, p < 0.001, d = 1.33 (Figure 5B). Together, these analyses show that
FOK ratings remained closely tied to restudy choices, such that cues evoking greater FOK were
restudied more often.

Is information-seeking influenced by priming of face cues?
In order to investigate our second goal of the study, we compared the proportion of face-name
pairs with primed face cues that were selected for restudy, with the proportion of pairs with
unprimed face cues that were restudied. This comparison closely paralleled how we examined
the impact of prior memorisation of face name-pairs on information-seeking behaviour in
Experiment 1 but addressed the impact of cue familiarity more directly. Our analysis revealed
that participants chose to restudy the names associated with primed faces at a more frequent rate
than the names corresponding to unprimed faces (see Table 1 for restudy proportions), t(28) =
4.36, p < 0.001, d = 0.81. This pattern also held when we restricted the analysis to trials in which
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perceived recall was unsuccessful in the FOK test phase (see Table 1 for restudy proportions),
t(28) = 4.44, p < 0.001, d = 0.82. Taken together these results suggest that cue familiarity, a
factor that has previously been shown to influence FOKs in numerous studies (Schwartz and
Metcalfe, 1992; Metcalfe et al., 1993; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001), also influenced subsequent
information-seeking behaviour.

Is the relationship between priming and information-seeking tied to FOK ratings?
The analyses presented on the relationship between priming and subsequent restudy choices so
far do not provide information as to whether this effect is tied to FOK ratings or independent. To
address this question, a mixed-effects modelling analysis was performed. A similar procedure
was used to develop the model as in Experiment 1. Specifically, it included fixed effect terms for
FOK rating, cue familiarity and the interaction between these factors (see Supplemental
Information Section for details of model development). With this model, we found that restudy
choices were predicted by FOK ratings for all items, regardless of the level of familiarity of the
cue (see Table 4). For unprimed items, the odds that an item with a given FOK rating would be
selected for restudy increased to almost 1.5 times that of an item with a FOK rating 1-point less.
For primed items, the odds increased by 1.75 for each FOK rating. The odds, however, were not
significantly different for primed as compared to unprimed items, as evident by the nonsignificant interaction between priming and FOK. Finally, there was no significant difference in
the odds that highly familiar cues would be restudied compared to those with low familiarity,
independent of FOK rating. Overall, these results suggest that the influence of cue familiarity on
information-seeking is closely tied to FOK ratings.
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Discussion
We conducted two experiments that aimed to elucidate links between experiential aspects of
memory retrieval and curiosity. Specifically, we examined links between metacognitive FOK
experiences and duration of ongoing memory search, subsequent information-seeking, and their
relationship. In each experiment we employed an episodic FOK paradigm with face-name pairs
that was followed by a restudy phase, which provided means to determine whether FOK
experiences bias subsequent information-seeking behaviour towards information that participants
could not recall but that they expected to be able to recognise.
Results in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 replicated the well established positive
relationship between the FOK ratings participants provided and corresponding response times.
We observed a similar positive relationship between FOK ratings and subsequent informationseeking, as reflected in restudy choices under conditions in which such opportunities were
limited. Critically, our experimental manipulations of FOK experiences through alterations in
cue familiarity also had parallel effects on information-seeking behaviour in both experiments. In
Experiment 1, participants showed higher FOKs for previously studied than novel face cues.
This effect on FOKs went hand in hand with longer response times and a bias in subsequent
information-seeking for faces that were initially studied compared to those that were novel. In
Experiment 2, faces that had been primed prior to initial study were given higher FOK ratings,
and were also selected more frequently for subsequent restudy than unprimed faces. Linear
mixed-effects modelling revealed that the observed differences in search time (in Experiment 1)
and information-seeking behaviour (i.e. away from novel items in Experiment 1 and toward
primed items in Experiment 2) that resulted from our experimental manipulations were indeed
tied to the effects they exerted on FOK ratings. Overall, these findings suggest that FOK
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experiences at retrieval have pervasive motivational consequences on information-seeking that
reflect state curiosity and that can be understood within the theoretical framework of
metacognition that emphasise its control function.
The present results replicate and extend the outcome of prior research that has addressed
the control function of FOKs as metacognitive experiences. As discussed, numerous studies have
reported correlations between FOK experiences and the duration of attempted recall in semantic
FOK paradigms (Gruneberg et al., 1977; Nelson & Narens, 1980; Nelson et al., 1984;
Costermans et al., 1992). Experiment 1 showed that this relationship also holds for episodic FOK
experiences. Further, past research has also revealed a relationship between FOK experiences
and information-seeking behaviour as reflected in restudy choices in an episodic FOK
paradigm (Hanczakowski et al., 2014). Notably, however, this relationship was previously
demonstrated under conditions in which these choices immediately followed an initial recall
attempt for the same item. The current experiments reveal that this motivational consequence of
FOK experiences is lasting, and continues to shape information-seeking behaviour even outside
of the immediate context of an unsuccessful memory search. Similar to Hanczakowski et al.
(2014) the current experiments also show that the impact of cue familiarity, particularly with the
more selective priming manipulation in Experiment 2, on FOKs is paralleled by an increase in
subsequent restudy choices. Notably, in Experiment 1, the initially studied items that participants
chose to seek out more often were the majority of items, while in Experiment 2 participants
chose primed items for restudy more frequently and these were the minority of items. This
pattern of results across experiments lends support to the conclusion that the manipulation of cue
familiarity, rather than the composition of the list, drives the observed biases in information-
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seeking. The mixed-effects models we conducted add to this evidence by suggesting that the
experiential aspect of FOKs plays a critical role in the control of behaviour.
Within the rationale of our experiments, we interpret restudy choices as markers of
curiosity. Although experiments on the impact of curiosity on learning typically include ratings
of curiosity on an item-by-item basis (e.g. Kang et al., 2009; Gruber et al 2014; Metcalfe et al.,
2017), we argue that in order to assess curiosity an examination of information-seeking
behaviour is sufficient and no additional subjective ratings are required. This argument rests on
the definition of curiosity that is widely shared in the literature and makes immediate reference
to information seeking behaviour (Loewenstein, 1994; Kidd & Hayden, 2015; Gottlieb et al.,
2016; Metcalfe et al., 2020). Indeed, studies on state curiosity in non-human species and in child
development typically adopt this rationale as well (e.g. Smock & Holt, 1962; Daddaoua,et al.,
2016). Moreover, several studies in adult humans on curiosity have also relied on objective
behavioural markers, including giving participants a choice as to which stimuli they want to be
exposed to (Hsee & Ruan, 2016; Lau et al., 2018; Oosterwijk et al., 2019), a set-up that parallels
the approach we took in the current. Nevertheless, these claims would benefit from further
examination in future research on motivational consequences of FOKs, which could include
curiosity ratings in the absence of any assessment of restudy behaviour.
Another important consideration, when interpreting our findings in relation to curiosity,
is whether the restudy choices participants made were intrinsically motivated, given that this is
also a defining characteristic of curiosity. Could it be that participants simply made their restudy
choices in a targeted effort to maximize future test performance for the face-name associations
(which were probed again in the final phase of the experiment)? To address this point, it is
critical to take a closer look at our experimental set-up, and focus on participants’ general
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expectations about the goals of the study they participated in. Notably, prior to start, participants
were not informed about the structure of the experiment beyond the approximate length and the
fact that it is a study on memory and motivation. Other than this general information, they were
only given instructions for each phase right at its start. In other words, participants were not
informed about the final recognition-memory test until after they had completed the restudy
phase. Critically, participants had already performed a memory test (during the FOK test phase)
when they entered the restudy phase. With these points in mind, we feel justified in interpreting
the restudy behaviour as a reflection of intrinsic motivation in the current study. Future research
could provide further evidence to bolster this claim, for example, by including assessment of
satisfaction immediately after unveiling of the sought information (see Marvin & Shohamy,
2016, for a similar approach). If restudy behaviour is reflective of intrinsic motivation, as we
argue, then obtaining access to this information can be expected to be experienced as satisfying.
Although on the surface decisions to terminate memory search reflect behaviour that is
clearly different from decisions that pertain to opportunities for further study, the present results
suggest that they may be based on shared motivational mechanisms. Of most
relevance, Experiment 1 revealed strong parallels in the effects of the cue-familiarity
manipulation on search time and restudy choices, with both effects being tied to FOK
experiences. Moreover, items chosen for restudy had longer memory-search durations than those
not chosen. While this pattern of results does not establish the presence of shared mechanisms
with certainty, they invite this interpretation when considered in the context of work on curiosity.
State curiosity is defined in direct relation to information-seeking and is thought to motivate
behaviour that resolves uncertainty, with successful access to critical information providing a
reward (Kidd & Hayden, 2015; Gottlieb et al., 2016; Gottlieb & Oudeyer 2018; Gruber &
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Ranganath, 2019). Although curiosity is typically defined with reference to exploration of the
external environment in an attempt to acquire information or knowledge (Berlyne, 1966; Gottlieb
et al., 2013), such a definition could also be applied to ‘internal’ memory search. In a nutshell,
memory search also involves information-seeking that aims to resolve uncertainty.
Metacognitive retrieval experiences that arise during this search may trigger motivational
mechanisms that could drive ongoing retrieval efforts as well as future behaviour geared towards
further exploration of the external environment. Future research may build on this curiositybased framework so as to identify the suggested shared motivational mechanisms. For example,
future imaging studies could determine whether the engagement of reward circuitry predicts both
types of information-seeking behaviour.
Other findings from research on metacognition indicate that the reported links between
retrieval experiences and curiosity may not be limited to FOKs. Indeed a similar relationship has
been documented for the TOT phenomenon (Litman et al., 2005; Metcalfe et al., 2017). Litman
et al. (2005) presented participants with general knowledge questions and asked them to indicate
whether they knew or did not know the answer, or whether they were in a TOT state (i.e. “The
answer is on the tip-of-my-tongue”). Following these questions, participants provided a curiosity
rating for each fact and, in a final phase of the experiment, they were allowed to explore the
answers to any of the questions that had been presented earlier. Results showed that facts which
induced a TOT experience received higher curiosity ratings and were more frequently explored,
relative to those participants knew or did not know. Metcalfe et al. (2017) obtained similar
findings when they probed information-seeking behaviour immediately following a TOT
experience for semantic facts.
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Research on judgements-of-learning (JOL) suggests that a positive relationship between
metacognitive experiences and curiosity is, however, not ubiquitous across all metacognitive
judgements. DeCaro & Thomas (2019) had participants attempt to recall members of previously
studied word-pairs, using the other pair-members as cues. Following this recall attempt,
participants provided a JOL, which probes the likelihood a word-pair could be successfully
learned during a future study phase. The experiment also included a restudy phase that required
participants to select a subset of items for further memorisation. Results revealed a significant
correlation between reported JOL experiences and restudy choices. Unlike in the current study
and in research on TOTs, however, the correlation between metacognitive ratings and restudy
choices was found to be negative, such that items with lower JOL ratings were restudied more
frequently than those with higher ratings. This pattern of findings across studies raises the
interesting question as to what component-processes trigger the motivational mechanisms that
increase subsequent information-seeking behaviour. This question deserves careful consideration
in future research involving the examination of information-seeking following systematic
manipulation of different types of memory judgments.
Within the broader literature on curiosity, the current findings can be interpreted in
relation to Loewenstein’s influential theory on information gaps. This work suggests that
curiosity arises due to differences between what we want to know and what we actually know, a
factor termed an information gap (Loewenstein, 1994). In other words, from Loewenstein’s
perspective, for curiosity to be initiated there must be an unknown piece of information, and the
individual must actually want to know about this information. Importantly however, recent work
has argued that, while information gaps are indeed critical, for curiosity to be highest, the gap
may need to be in a specific range. This optimal information gap has been deemed the Region of
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Proximal Learning (RPL), and can be defined as the situation where an information gap is small
enough to be judged as possible to be closed (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003; Metcalfe & Kornell,
2005; Metcalfe et al., 2017; Metcalfe et al., 2020). Put another way, the gap must not be so large
that individuals feel they will not learn the information, but also not so small that they perceive
they have more or less mastered it. A recent review by Metcalfe and colleagues suggests a
important link between the RPL and curiosity (2020). In their framework, the two critical steps
to spark curiosity are an unsuccessful recall attempt and a metacognitive experience indicating
that the sought-after information is close to being learned, or within the RPL. The metacognitive
retrieval experience most frequently examined in studies on the RPL is the TOT state (e.g.
Metcalfe et al., 2017; Bloom et al., 2018; see DeCaro et al., 2019 for pertinent research on
JOLs), as it intuitively reflects an experience in which information can almost but not completely
be accessed. Considered in the context of the current study, we propose that FOK experiences
also fulfill the two steps of the RPL that spark curiosity. Specifically, we report that these
experiences predicted restudy choices under conditions in which recall was perceived to be
unsuccessful, and in which participants had the impression that they could easily recognize the
corresponding name. From this perspective, our observation that participants’ tendency to
restudy items that induced high FOKs is in line with the idea that curiosity peaks when the
information gap for an item is in the RPL.
While we provide evidence in support of a relationship between FOK experiences and the
control of behaviour as reflected in response time during memory search and in subsequent
restudy choices, we recognise that it remains difficult to establish causality in this observed
relationship. Notably, it has been suggested that response times may not be the consequence of
FOKs but rather a heuristic clue that informs them (see Koriat, 2007 and Metcalfe, 2009 for
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discussion). For restudy choices, concerns about cause and effect may be less pressing in the
current study, given that they followed the expression of FOKs in a separate experimental phase.
The results of our experimental manipulation of FOKs provides additional evidence that gives
credence to a causal interpretation, again particularly for information-seeking behaviour during
restudy. By virtue of introducing entirely novel (Experiment 1) or primed faces (Experiment 2)
in the FOK test phase, we were able to decrease or increase FOKs in a predictable manner,
respectively, and influence information-seeking in a parallel fashion. Definitive evidence for a
casual role could be established through direct manipulations of the neural mechanisms that
drive information-seeking behaviour. As noted, interactions between brain regions that form the
reward circuitry are closely tied to curiosity and involve dopamine as their primary
neurotransmitter (see Gruber & Ranganath, 2019, for review). More specifically, studies have
shown these reward-related areas track the degree of self-reported curiosity (e.g. Kang et al.,
2009; Gruber et al., 2014). As such, pharmacological manipulations of dopamine may allow for
the assessment of a causal relationship between FOKs and the objective markers of curiosity
probed in the current study. A related prediction is that the pharmacological alteration of
dopamine (e.g. through the dopamine D2 receptor antagonist haloperidol) would lead to a
decoupling between FOKs, search times, and subsequent restudy choice behaviour (see Clos et
al., 2019, for a suitable study design).
In conclusion, the present study revealed that curiosity is not only intimately tied to
learning but also has links to episodic memory retrieval. The evidence presented argues in favour
of the general notion that metacognitive experiences accompanying unsuccessful retrieval from
episodic memory can induce states of curiosity that exert control over information-seeking
behaviour beyond the immediate retrieval context. From this perspective, curiosity may act as a
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bond that ensures that memory gaps identified through unsuccessful retrieval can adaptively
guide future learning.
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Table 1.
Summary of behavioural data for Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 1

Previously
Studied

Novel

Total

Proportion of trials
FOK rating
Proportion restudied
Recognition accuracy
Response time (ms)
Proportion of trials
FOK rating
Proportion restudied
Recognition accuracy
Response time (ms)
Proportion of trials

No Perceived
Recall Success

Perceived
Recall Success

0.92 (0.12)
2.26 (0.49)
0.48 (0.10)
0.47 (0.12)
3386 (2032)
0.98 (0.05)
1.54 (0.36)
0.41 (0.15)
0.36 (0.12)
3019 (1927)
0.94 (0.09)

0.08 (0.12)
4.51 (0.65)
0.68 (0.38)
0.56 (0.36)
5106 (3155)
0.02 (0.05)
4.36 (0.72)
0.59 (0.45)
0 (0)
4928 (4100)
0.06 (0.09)

All Trials

2.42 (0.51)
0.49 (0.09)
0.48 (0.12)
3410 (1953)
1.59 (0.41)
0.41 (0.14)
0.36 (0.12)
3028 (1918)

Experiment 2
No Perceived
Recall Success
Primed

Perceived
Recall Success

All Trials

Proportion of trials
0.76 (0.17)
0.24 (0.17)
FOK rating
2.68 (0.48)
4.30 (0.53)
3.08 (0.45)
Proportion restudied
0.50 (0.11)
0.67 (0.26)
0.54 (0.10)
Recognition accuracy
0.45 (0.18)
0.58 (0.43)
0.47 (0.18)
Unprimed
Proportion of trials
0.86 (0.11)
0.14 (0.11)
FOK rating
2.24 (0.34)
4.26 (0.52)
2.49 (0.35)
Proportion restudied
0.38 (0.11)
0.67 (0.28)
0.42 (0.09)
Recognition accuracy
0.48 (0.14)
0.70 (0.33)
0.49 (0.14)
Total
Proportion of trials
0.83 (0.12)
0.17 (0.12)
Note: Data are shown as Mean (SD). Recognition accuracy is for trials not selected for restudy
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Table 2.
Results of the mixed-effects model used to predict the response times during the FOK test phase
in Experiment 1.
Fixed Effects

β (SE)

t

p

Intercept
FOK
Cue Status
FOK x Status (Initially Studied)

0.59 (0.13)
0.23 (0.04)
0.07 (0.06)
-0.05 (0.03)

4.74
6.47
1.21
-1.73

< 0.001
< 0.001
0.23
0.08

Random Effects

Variance (SD)

Intercept
Slope - Item
Slope - Subject
Residual

Item
Subject
FOK
FOK

0.01 (0.03)
0.24 (0.49)
0.00 (0.03)
0.02 (0.12)
0.45 (0.67)
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Table 3.
Results of the mixed-effects model used to predict subsequent information-seeking choices in
Experiment 1.
Fixed Effects

β (SE)

z

p

Intercept
FOK
Cue Status
FOK x Status (Initially Studied)

-0.61 (0.19)
0.14 (0.095)
-0.24 (0.21)
0.22 (0.10)

-3.20
1.43
-1.12
2.16

0.0014
0.15
0.26
0.030

Random Effects

Variance (SD)

Intercept
Slope - Item

Slope - Subject

Item
Cue Status (Novel)
Cue Status (Initially Studied)
FOK
Cue Status (Novel)
Cue Status (Initially Studied)
FOK

0.013 (0.11)
0.014 (0.12)
0.095 (0.31)
0.00 (0.00)
0.38 (0.62)
0.091 (0.30)
0.025 (0.16)
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Table 4.
Results of the mixed-effects model used to predict subsequent information-seeking choices in
Experiment 2.
Fixed Effects

β (SE)

z

p

Intercept
FOK
Cue Status
FOK x Status (Primed)

-1.39 (0.18)
0.38 (0.065)
-0.058 (0.30)
0.18 (0.11)

-7.86
5.75
-0.20
1.65

< 0.001
< 0.001
0.84
0.010

Random Effects

Variance (SD)

Intercept
Slope - Item

Slope - Subject

Item
Cue Status (Unprimed)
Cue Status (Primed)
FOK
Cue Status (Unprimed)
Cue Status (Primed)
FOK

0.0056 (0.075)
0.040 (0.20)
0.031 (0.18)
0.022 (0.15)
0.19 (0.44)
0.060 (0.25)
0.00 (0.00)

